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CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AS A PROBLEM
OF INEQUALITY AND POSSIBLE
LEGAL REFORMS
David A. Dana
ABSTRACT—Climate change will necessitate adaptation in all parts of the
United States, but some individuals and localities will be better able to adapt
than others. Wealth inequalities among individuals and localities already are
translating—and will continue to translate—into inequalities between the
rich and poor in their capacity to adapt. Current federal disaster aid programs
and policies exacerbate these inequalities by favoring the wealthy, and future
government resource management decisions and investments also may
broaden the gap between rich and poor in terms of the economic and other
costs they will bear from climate change. Some have suggested broadening
Takings Clause liability as a means to address the problem of inequality and
climate change adaptation. However, these suggested doctrinal reforms, if
anything, would skew government actors to provide even greater protection
to wealthy communities and even less to low-income ones. Broadening the
public trust doctrine could help address some of the inequality problems
associated with climate change, but the most important reforms needed
involve the integration of equality analysis and equality concerns into all
levels of administrative decision-making. And those reforms, in turn, will
require a climate-aware, equality-focused, and politically effective
electorate.
AUTHOR—Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University
Pritzker School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The differential capacities of wealthy and poor nations to adapt to
climate change is a phenomenon demanding study and attention.1 This is an
uncontroversial proposition. Indeed, although real action has not always
followed rhetoric, major wealthy nations in international climate talks at
least have agreed to subsidize and support the adaptation efforts of poorer
nations.2
By comparison, the question of inequality and climate change
adaptation within the United States has received little attention, especially
from legal scholars.3 This Essay seeks to address the gap in the literature by
posing and (very tentatively) answering several questions regarding climate
change adaptation and inequality in the context of the United States.
The first question relates to the ways in which existing wealth
inequalities among individuals and localities will translate into disparities in
how well—or how poorly—individuals and localities adapt to climate
change. The United States is characterized by massive inequality in the assets

1
See generally Joe McCarthy, Rich Countries Need to Help Poor Ones Adapt to Climate Change,
GLOB. CITIZEN (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/rich-countries-pay-poorcountries-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/PJV6-GZAK] (“[T]he poorest countries have contributed the
least to climate change and have the least resources for adaptation.”).
2
See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Rich Nations Hatch Plan for $100 Billion Climate Aid, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
22, 2021, 6:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-22/deal-struck-on-100-billionclimate-aid-plan-for-poor-nations [https://perma.cc/9ZZ8-72W6] (explaining that rich countries have
fallen short in pledged aid for previous years).
3
A notable exception is Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENV’T
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11125, 11126 (2012) (arguing that “equity considerations should play a vital
role in emerging U.S. adaptation initiatives” and identifying “a set of principles designed to achieve
equitable adaptation and further climate justice”).
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owned by and resources available to households and localities. 4 These
inequalities in wealth can translate into inequalities of welfare,5 which also
may be true with respect to climate adaptation. Wealthier individuals can do
what less wealthy ones may not be able to: buy more insurance, renovate or
rebuild to make their homes more resilient, finance repairs and other costs of
climate adaptation, or relocate. Moreover, household wealth also affects
property tax revenue, which in turn affects the ability of local governments
to adapt. State and federal regulation can constrain wealthier people and
localities from protecting themselves from climate effects such as flooding
and fire in certain ways that may be counterproductive to society as a whole.
However, it seems doubtful that regulatory constraints will substantially
temper the advantages of wealth for individuals and households, including
the biggest advantage of all—the ability to relocate to areas that are at lower
climate risk and hence are more expensive than those susceptible to the
effects of climate change.
A second question is: How will inequality with respect to climate
adaptation be affected by state and federal decisions regarding resource
management and adaptation investments? If those management decisions
and investments skew in favor of wealthy individuals and localities who,
without state and federal aid, are already at an advantage, such decisions will
enhance inequality; if they skew in favor of low-income individuals and
communities, the decisions will lessen inequality. There are theoretical and
historical reasons to believe that the federal and state governments ultimately
will favor the wealthy, and certainly our federal disaster and postdisaster
funding system to date has done so.6

4
See Gillian B. White, U.S. Ranks 23rd out of 30 Developed Countries for Inequality, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/wef-davos-inequality/513185/
[https://perma.cc/QNC9-RSA3] (reporting that in terms of equality, the United States ranked twenty-third
out of thirty developed countries); Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S.,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-abouteconomic-inequality-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/6EYL-MHRT] (stating that the United States has the
highest level of inequality among G7 countries); Trevon Logan, Bradley Hardy & John Parman, LongRun Analysis of Regional Inequalities in the US, 37 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 49, 49 (2021) (exploring
regional inequality over time); Robert A. Schapiro, States of Inequality: Fiscal Federalism, Unequal
States, and Unequal People, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1531, 1533–36, 1538 (2020) (exploring the inequality
in resources and wealth among the states).
5
See, e.g., Fabian T. Pfeffer, Growing Wealth Gaps in Education, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 1033 (2018)
(addressing how differences in family wealth translate into different educational attainment); Vanessa
Wight, Neeraj Kaushal, Jane Waldfogel, & Irv Garfinkel, Understanding the Link Between Poverty and
Food Insecurity Among Children: Does the Definition of Poverty Matter?, 20 J. CHILD
POVERTY 1 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4096937/ [https://perma.cc/856EAQG7] (exploring the link between poverty and food insecurity).
6
See infra Part II.
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A third question, which follows from the first two, is: How should law
be adapted to reduce or eliminate inequalities associated with climate change
adaptation? Since so many of the effects of climate change will impact
property, in particular property in real estate and water, it seems reasonable
to consider whether property law should be adapted to take account of
climate change. It has been suggested that takings doctrine should be
modified in order to make government more evenhanded in protecting
property and compensating property owners, those who are wealthy and
those who are decidedly not. In particular, commentators have suggested two
modifications: (1) a relaxation of the “action” requirement and (2) the
curtailment or elimination of the emergency exception to liability in the
kinds of situations that have arisen and will arise with climate change.
These proposed modifications, while superficially appealing, would be
counterproductive from an equality perspective. The modifications would
encourage the government to devote more resources to wealthy areas and
communities with high-market-value properties, and would be a boon to
wealthy, litigious property owners. Instead, a better alternative could be
found in a modification to public trust law. Because climate change and
adaptation may create a country with simultaneously less usable and much
more expensive seashores and waterfronts, a modification to public trust law
would allow more public access to and use of privately owned seashore and
waterfront land.
However, property law is not the principal way in which law can and
should be adapted to address the inequality problem in the climate context.
Among other things, administrative law needs to include environmental
impact review by agencies that is more meaningful than what the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its counterparts call for under current
law. This review should place issues of equality regarding adaptation front
and center and place the burden on the agency to explain why it is not
choosing equality-enhancing alternatives. Relatedly, cost–benefit analysis as
conducted by agencies should be modified to genuinely consider the costs of
inequality. But such reforms possibly presuppose new legislation, certainly
presuppose new legislative funding and programmatic regulation, and above
all presuppose sympathetic, committed, and empowered agency leadership.
All of that is achievable only with the election of officeholders who care
enough about inequality in the climate context to institute reform. In the end,
the answer to how to reform the law vis-à-vis adaptation thus lies, as it does
with respect to the climate issue writ large, with an informed, mobilized, and
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supportive electorate—an electorate that we do not yet have, except perhaps
in certain states, in the United States.7
I.

EX ANTE INEQUALITY AS A SOURCE OF CLIMATE
ADAPTATION INEQUALITIES

Wealthy individuals and households are better able to adapt to climaterelated phenomena such as extreme heat, drought, wildfires, and flooding.
Consider renters and property owners near the seashore or any other body of
water where there is flooding risk. Renters, who on average have less wealth
than owners, may have no way to make the structures they live in safer.
Wealthier owners, on the other hand, can do what less wealthy ones may not:
buy more insurance (even at a high cost), renovate or even rebuild to make
their homes more resilient against flooding, and finance postflooding repairs
and other costs. 8 Wealthier people can afford better and more energyefficient cooling systems in their homes, and they may have more
opportunities to telecommute and thus avoid venturing outside or using
public transport when there are heat waves.9
Individuals also can adapt by moving to a physical site, neighborhood,
or locality that offers better protection from climate effects, whereas local
governments must remain in place. As noted, wealth sometimes may allow
property owners to make the necessary investment to remain safely and
comfortably in areas subject to climate-related risks. But sometimes, in some
locations, the investments may not seem worth it, or the climate risks simply
may be so daunting that no investment can protect against them. The wealthy
can afford to adapt by moving to places that have physical characteristics or
government-backed protections that make them safer and, logically, more
7
To date, the records of different states reflect varied levels of political will to address climate
challenges. See, e.g., State-Level Preparedness Report Cards, CLIMATE CENT. (Nov.
18, 2015), https://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/states-at-risk-a-preparedness-report-card
[https://perma.cc/RZ9Y-9QDL] (explaining that the states that face the greatest climate change threats
are very different from one another in how much they have invested in climate preparedness). Another
indication of variation among the states vis-à-vis climate change commitments is that some states, such
as New Jersey and Massachusetts, have up-to-date statewide adaptation plans, while many other states
have no plan at all. State Adaptation Progress Tracker, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., https://www.georgetown
climate.org/adaptation/plans.html [https://perma.cc/HWY5-LB6J].
8
See Kenneth A. Gould & Tammy L. Lewis, Resilience Gentrification: Environmental
Privilege in an Age of Coastal Climate Disasters, 3 FRONTIERS SUSTAINABLE CITIES 1, 3–4,
9 (2021), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsc.2021.687670/full [https://perma.cc/HGL7WA2S] (explaining how rebuilding sustainably in coastal areas is expensive and selects for wealthy
owners and buyers).
9
See Cutler J. Cleveland, Alicia Zhang, Jacqueline Ashmore & Taylor Dudley, Telework Mostly
Benefits White, Affluent Americans – and Offers Few Climate Benefits, CONVERSATION (July 22, 2020,
7:58 AM), https://theconversation.com/telework-mostly-benefits-white-affluent-americans-and-offersfew-climate-benefits-142251 [https://perma.cc/GG2R-AAQJ].
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expensive. For example, in Miami, which faces some of the most dramatic
flooding risks in the United States,10 there has already been a movement of
high-income households to somewhat more elevated locations slightly
inland. 11 Indeed, “climate gentrification”—the gentrification brought by
high-income people moving to neighborhoods that have become more
attractive because of climate change—is now an established term in popular
and academic discourse.12
Household wealth also affects property tax revenue, which in the United
States often accounts for the bulk of local budgets. Household wealth,
through its effect on property tax revenue, thereby affects a local
government’s ability to adapt to climate risks by, for example, upgrading
sewer lines for greater storm overflows or planting trees to provide shade. In
the United States, localities tend to be stratified by wealth (although in larger
cities and counties, the stratification may be within the locality13). Wealthier
localities can raise more revenue to invest in adaptation than less wealthy
ones. Thus, household wealth facilitates adaptation at both the household and
locality levels.

10
Miami, Florida, FLOOD FACTOR, https://floodfactor.com/city/miami-florida/1245000_fsid
[https://perma.cc/5A3R-8SU2] (assigning a “severe risk of flooding” to Miami).
11
See, e.g., Patrick Sisson, As Sea Level Rises, Miami Neighborhoods
Feel Rising Tide of Gentrification, CURBED (Feb. 10, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://archive.curbed.com/
2020/2/10/21128496/miami-real-estate-climate-change-gentrification [https://perma.cc/MP2H-CJDG]
(discussing the possible connection between flooding risk and gentrification of elevated inland
neighborhoods); Mario Alejandro Ariza, As Miami Keeps Building, Rising Seas Deepen Its Social Divide,
YALE ENV’T 360 (Sept. 29, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-miami-keeps-building-rising-seasdeepen-its-social-divide [https://perma.cc/2NUM-LRC5] (explaining how rising tides in Miami could
worsen inequality by displacing residents of high-ground low-income areas); Jesse M Keenan, Thomas
Hill & Anurag Gumber, Climate Gentrification: From Theory to Empiricism in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1, 9–10 (2018) (finding that land elevation could impact long-term
home values in Miami, and consumers may prefer higher elevation land).
12
See Michael Allen, Protection for the Rich, Retreat for the Poor, HAKAI MAG. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://hakaimagazine.com/news/protection-for-the-rich-retreat-for-the-poor [https://perma.cc/XV9ZLNUF]; Casey Tolan, High Ground, High Prices, CNN (Mar. 3, 2021, 10:00 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2021/03/us/climate-gentrification-cnnphotos-invs/ [https://perma.cc/
TH7E-WJJG]; Climate Gentrification and Resilience Planning: What Is at Stake for At-Risk
Communities?, ENV’T L. INST. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environment-blog/climategentrification-and-resilience-planning-what-stake-risk-communities [https://perma.cc/UWR2-ZJAC];
Isabelle Anguelovski et al., Why Green “Climate Gentrification” Threatens Poor and Vulnerable
Populations, 116 PNAS 26139, 26139 (2019), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/52/26139.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZK6D-A3SF]; Gould & Lewis, supra note 8, at 5 n.3.
13
See Estelle Sommeiller, Mark Price & Ellis Wazeter, Income Inequality in the U.S. by State,
Metropolitan Area, and County, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 16, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/
income-inequality-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/BU8T-AREM] (“Fifty-four of 916 metropolitan areas had
gaps wider than the national gap. In the 12 most unequal metropolitan areas, the average income of the
top 1 percent was at least 40 times greater than the average income of the bottom 99 percent.”).

76

117:71 (2022)

Climate Change Adaptation

The inequality among individuals and households in their relative
abilities to adapt to climate change could be tempered by governments in two
ways: (1) by directly subsidizing lower income households and localities so
that they can undertake adaptation in ways similar to wealthy households and
localities (which, so far, has not been a clearly articulated goal of federal or
state legislation and programs14), or (2) by prohibiting wealthy individuals
and localities from engaging in adaptation measures that are only possible
because of wealth.
This second possibility obviously raises the question of how
governments could justify stopping individuals or localities from using their
wealth to better their circumstances in the face of climate change. Even if the
United States were a wildly more egalitarian nation than it is, it would be
difficult for any politician or regulator to support stopping an individual or
locality from helping themselves solely in the name of fighting for overall
equality. Rather, the politician or regulator would need to articulate a reason
that the wealthy’s adaptation actually would make the environment and
society altogether worse off. Moreover, moving to a location that is better
protected from climate-related harms—one of the biggest ways individuals
with resources can adapt—is not something one would think the federal or
state government would seek to prohibit.15
Seawall restrictions are one example of governments restricting
adaptation by individual property owners. A number of coastal states
prohibit or substantially condition the construction of private seawalls. And
for good reason: seawalls may contribute to long-term coastal erosion and
thus may be an environmentally problematic flood-control strategy. They
also can directly intensify flooding in neighboring areas not protected by
seawalls. 16 While property owners have argued these seawall restrictions
14
One notable exception is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s
recently announced “Climate Communities Initiative,” which HUD explains will be a “partnership with
local leaders,” in which HUD will provide “a suite of resources, support, and tools to help cities respond
to equitably [sic] the climate crisis.” Climate Resilience and Adaptation, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/climate/resilience_and_adaptation [https://perma.cc/BA74-4FCG].
15
Interstate travel is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but it is
far from clear that intrastate travel is a federally protected right. See Mitchell Crusto, Enslaved
Constitution: Obstructing the Freedom to Travel, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 236–40 (2008). Nonetheless,
it would be remarkable and politically, if perhaps not legally, untenable if a state government were to
directly restrict internal movement of people within a state.
16
See, e.g., Alex Brown, Coastal States Seek to Limit Seawall Construction, PEW:
STATELINE (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2021/10/28/coastal-states-seek-to-limit-seawall-construction [https://perma.cc/B7MS-LSWD]; JESSICA
GRANNIS, ADAPTATION TOOL KIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE:
HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN USE LAND-USE PRACTICES TO ADAPT TO SEA-LEVEL
RISE 5–6 (2011), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/Adaptation_Tool_Kit_SLR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6KR-RHBM].
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constitute takings, courts have rebuffed these claims, explaining that the
government itself is not causing sea-level rise and flooding and that property
owners often bought their property with specific notice of restrictions on the
construction of seawalls.17
One could imagine analogous restrictions with respect to the retention
and use of private firefighters. Faced with repeated fires threatening their
properties, wealthy landowners (including, as the tabloids reported, Kim
Kardashian) have hired their own firefighters to supplement local, state, and
federal efforts.18 Some of the private firefighters may have engaged in illegal
use of backfires in an effort to protect the properties under their care.19 More
generally, private firefighters can complicate and confuse large-scale
government efforts to contain and manage fires and ensure safe
evacuations, 20 although as of yet no jurisdiction has restricted the use of
private firefighters. It also seems conceivable that, in times of intense
drought, governments would seek to curb the ability of private entities to buy
water rights for adaptation uses such as private firefighting, as such
purchases might undercut the ability of governments to ensure that the basic
household water needs of the general public are met.
In sum, existing wealth inequalities will advantage wealthy individuals
and localities in adapting to climate change, although some forms of private
adaptation may be restricted or prohibited. As discussed below, government
resource management and investment decisions may exacerbate the
disparities in adaptive capacity that are rooted in and reflect wealth
inequalities.

17
See Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 192–93, 202 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450–51 (Or. 1993); Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson,
517 S.E.2d 406, 409, 414–15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
18
See Vicki Newman, Why Kim Kardashian and Kanye West Hired Private Firefighters to Save
Their Home, MIRROR (Nov. 13, 2018, 7:32 PM), https://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/kimkardashian-kanye-west-hired-13585495 [https://perma.cc/S8H3-8G4H].
19
See Alexandra Ulmer, Private Firefighters Fuel Tensions While Saving California Vineyards and
Mansions, REUTERS (May 14, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/private-firefighters-fueltensions-while-saving-california-vineyards-mansions-2021-05-14/ [https://perma.cc/37WS-CX3Z].
20
See Ethan Varian, While California Fires Rage, the Rich Hire Private Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/style/private-firefighters-california.html
[https://perma.cc/H58H-X5C7] (“Private fire teams that show up to protect homes sometimes neglect to
coordinate with emergency agencies and can hinder evacuation efforts . . . .”); Chiara Sottile, Wealthy’s
Use of Private Firefighters Ignites Debate in Wildfire Country, NBC NEWS (May 4, 2018, 3:37 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/western-wildfires/wildfire-prone-states-wealthy-pay-have-privatefirefighters-protect-their-n869061 [https://perma.cc/UGM6-XA62] (“For some—including many
firefighters from municipalities—protection from a deadly wildfire isn’t something that some neighbors
should be able to buy when others can’t. Furthermore, many first responders express concern that a lack
of oversight and communication with private firefighters could add risk in an already dangerous fire
situation.”).
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II. FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT
DECISIONS AS A SOURCE OF CLIMATE-ADAPTATION INEQUALITIES
The resource-management and investment decisions of governments
may add to the inequalities associated with climate change. Governments—
especially federal and state—manage the flood-control systems in the United
States and make decisions about how to store and release water. Federal,
state, and local governments also play a large operational role with respect
to the management of water for household, commercial, agricultural, and
other uses—all of which can come under strain with climate-related drought.
Similarly, federal and state governments own and manage large swaths of
forest that may play a role in climate-related fires. How governments manage
these resources in an era of climate change can intentionally or incidentally
have inequality implications.
Governments at all levels also invest billions of dollars in climate
adaptation and resilience efforts, whether they call them that or not. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its various
programs, spends billions on weather emergency preparation and recovery,
which is a kind of adaptation expenditure program (even if sometimes not a
particularly good one). 21 Various states and localities also have extensive
adaptation plans.22 For example, in New York City, federal, state, and city
governments are trying to collaborate on a billion-dollar-plus riverfront
construction plan to protect the Lower East Side from the sort of flooding
experienced during Hurricane Sandy.23
Will government adaptation investment and resource decisions (both
long-term and emergency) skew toward protecting the least advantaged, or
will they focus on wealthy households and communities? Will they be
neutral, or provide some mix of favor? There are several reasons to suppose
that decisions will not favor the least advantaged and will focus on protecting
the assets held by wealthy people and corporations.

21
See Bridget Johnson, DHS Budget: FEMA Funding Request Focused on Climate Resilience,
Incident Response, HOMELAND SEC. TODAY (June 5, 2021), https://www.hstoday.us/federalpages/dhs/dhs-budget-fema-funding-request-focused-on-climate-resilience-incident-response/
[https://perma.cc/QM6Y-2HUV] (“The $28 billion FEMA budget request is nearly $1.9 billion more than
the amount enacted in fiscal year 2021, including more than $532 million more than the previous year to
fight climate change.”).
22
See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTATION PLANNING – WHAT U.S. STATES
AND LOCALITIES ARE DOING (2009), https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/state-localadaptation-planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9P9-7Q4J] (describing how individual states are, to varying
extents, engaging in a range of adaptation planning and activities).
23
Michael Kimmelman, What Does It Mean to Save a Neighborhood?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/us/hurricane-sandy-lower-manhattan-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/X25C-7SEH] (describing billion-dollar plans for the Lower East Side).
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First, as a general matter, business interests and wealthy people
command outsized attention in halls of power, in part because they have the
resources to organize to make their voices heard and to reward politicians
and officials who listen.24 Poor people in particular face disadvantages in the
market for political attention and solicitude.25 There is no obvious reason
why this general pattern also would not hold vis-à-vis climate adaptation.
Indeed, the history of large-scale public investments suggests that large-scale
adaptation investments could disadvantage the already disadvantaged.
Consider, for example, the great federal project of building the interstate
highway system—a project of a grand scale and scope perhaps comparable
to, if much less complicated than, the task of making the United States more
climate resilient. Highways were sited in such a way that they often
destroyed or segmented poor, working-class, and largely Black
neighborhoods, while wealthy and politically powerful communities were
spared and at the same time afforded the benefits of the new highways.26
Second, American agency policymaking has long embraced cost–
benefit analysis (especially at the federal level). In practice, that approach
has tended to prioritize readily quantifiable monetary or economic values
and leave out or only pay lip service to distributive concerns.27
In addition, there are some recent examples of government adaptation
initiatives and programs that seem to favor the wealthy. At least initially,
government flood-control investments in Miami heavily favored the richest
areas of the city.28 Beach replenishment projects everywhere entail a very
questionable adaptive practice that mostly benefits wealthy seashore owners

24
See generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/testing-theories-of-americanpolitics-elites-interest-groups-and-average-citizens/62327F513959D0A304D4893B382B992B
[https://perma.cc/RZS6-C2JY] (summarizing theories of U.S. political economy and concluding that the
evidence supports the view that economic elites drive government policy).
25
See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Electing to Ignore the Poorest of the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/business/economy/electing-to-ignore-the-poorest-of-thepoor.html [https://perma.cc/YL4B-YTQM] (noting that “both parties, focusing most of their concern on
the middle class, appear to be ignoring the Americans who need their attention most: the deeply,
persistently poor”).
26
See Noel King, A Brief History of How Racism Shaped Interstate Highways, NPR (Apr. 7, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/07/984784455/a-brief-history-of-how-racism-shaped-interstate-highways
[https://perma.cc/JRU6-N6E7]; Johnny Miller, Roads to Nowhere: How Infrastructure Built
on
American
Inequality,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
21,
2018,
2:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/feb/21/roads-nowhere-infrastructure-american-inequality
[https://perma.cc/R8BS-3ZW6].
27
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking
Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIA. L. REV. 335, 335–36, 339 (2011) (criticizing cost–benefit analysis).
28
See Ariza, supra note 11.
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but is funded by the public at large. 29 Perhaps most notably,
FEMA’s postdisaster-recovery, building-resilience, and voluntaryrelocation programs operate to support wealthy residential and commercial
owners. Relatively speaking, they give short shrift to lower income owners
and (even more so) to nonproperty owners affected by storms and the like.30
Because FEMA uses a cost-effectiveness approach to decide which
properties are worth repairing after a storm event, it tends to find that very
high-market-value properties are worth repairing, while low-market-value
properties may not qualify for any repair financing.31 As a result, FEMA’s
voluntary buyout program has tended to focus on lower income owners; but
even within that context, there is some reason to believe that the relatively
wealthier owners fare better than low-income ones. 32 And, by definition,
FEMA programs for repair and reconstruction of damaged properties and for

29
Steve Strunsky, Beach Replenishment Hurts the Environment, Subsidizes Wealthy Homeowners,
Group Argues, NJ.COM (Oct. 7, 2021, 5:38 PM), https://www.nj.com/news/2021/10/beachreplenishment-hurts-the-environment-subsidizes-wealthy-homeowners-group-argues.html
[https://perma.cc/PW9X-L5AZ] (discussing the complaint that beach replenishment is “an exercise in
futility that destroys natural ecosystems and subsidizes wealthy beachfront homeowners at taxpayers’
expense, particularly as worsening storms resulting form [sic] climate change demand investment in
more permanent solutions to beach erosion”).
30
See Rebecca Hersher & Robert Benincasa, How Federal Disaster Money Favors the Rich, NPR
(Mar. 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/688786177/how-federal-disaster-moneyfavors-the-rich [https://perma.cc/B2T5-963W] (“Put another way, after a disaster, rich people get richer
and poor people get poorer. And federal disaster spending appears to exacerbate that wealth inequality.”);
Junia Howell & James R. Elliott, Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of Natural Hazards on
Wealth Inequality in the United States, 66 SOC. PROBLEMS, 448, 461 (2019) (“Sociological research on
disasters has long documented how less-privileged residents often suffer losses in economic as well as
social and cultural resources after hazards hit, while more-privileged residents, by contrast, tend to
recover more quickly and may even benefit financially.”).
31
See Kelly McGee, A Place Worth Protecting: Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis Under FEMA’s
Flood-Mitigation Programs, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2021) (analyzing and critiquing FEMA’s
approach as ignoring distributive consequences and enhancing inequality). As the Environmental Defense
Fund explained:

[T]he BCA for FEMAs BRIC program relies on avoided property losses to estimate benefits. The
central challenge is that underserved communities, communities with both high flood risk and
increased socioeconomic vulnerability, often do not have the property values to justify costs
within [FEMA’s BCA framework]. The result is that those in chronically underserved
communities most vulnerable to losing their wealth and livelihoods in floods are largely
unprotected.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, RESPONSE TO METHODS AND LEADING PRACTICES FOR ADVANCING
EQUITY AND SUPPORT FOR UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES THROUGH GOVERNMENT (2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/OMB-2021-0005-0443 [https://perma.cc/6EB5-EVQJ].
32
See A.R. Siders, Social Justice Implications of US Managed Retreat Buyout Programs,
152 CLIMATIC
CHANGE
239,
250
(2019),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5
[https://perma.cc/X3EM-WKKL] (explaining that the buyout program tends to disperse low-income
households and leave them isolated, without the benefits of community ties).
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voluntary buyouts do nothing for renters who have no property interest to
use as a means of obtaining FEMA benefits.
There are arguable counterexamples, however. 33 And in reality, we
cannot know yet how various governments will act with respect to equality,
resource-management decisions, and adaptation investments, as climate
change continues to demand more planning, emergency management, and
investment. The answer almost certainly will depend on context, the
governments involved, and the kinds of adaptation at issue, among other
things. It also may depend on whether legal and political reforms, including
those discussed below, are adopted.
III. TAKINGS AND PUBLIC TRUST LAW “REFORM”
AS A RESPONSE TO CLIMATE-ADAPTATION INEQUALITIES
The Takings Clause provides for just compensation in response to
takings of private property for public use. 34 At least in theory, takings
doctrine could be modified to make it a better tool to protect lower income
communities from the effects of climate change. Indeed, a few commentators
have suggested two doctrinal modifications that would allow for a greater
number of successful takings suits against the government where it fails to
attend to or protect the needs of part of the population. Professors
Christopher Serkin and Timothy Mulvaney, with great nuance and
reservations, argue that takings doctrine should sometimes hold the
government liable for its inaction that results in loss of property.35 As one
commentator summarized:
33
See Aman Azhar, After Hurricane Harvey, a Heated Debate Over Flood Control Funds in Texas’
Harris County, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 4, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
04042021/after-hurricane-harvey-a-heated-debate-over-flood-control-funds-in-texas-harris-county/
[https://perma.cc/N5A9-UKQX] (“On the two-year anniversary of Hurricane Harvey in the summer of
2019, the newly Democratic [Houston County] commission passed a resolution directing the county’s
flood control district to ensure flood mitigation projects complied with an Equity Prioritization
Framework. The framework was based on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Social
Vulnerability Index, which considers such factors as family income, unemployment, poverty, crowded
housing, minority status, language barriers and vehicle access, among other factors.”). However,
community activists complain that actual funding plans to date do not follow this commitment to equity
and instead privilege wealthier communities, as in the past. Id.
34
U.S. CONST. art. V. State constitutions also contain comparable guarantees. See, e.g., ALA. CONST.
art. XII, § 235; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17.
35
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 191–95, 197–200
(2018) (acknowledging arguments on both sides regarding whether nonimplementation of a government
flood-control plan should constitute a taking); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s
Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2014) (“Sea-level rise provides an
important real-world illustration of the potential payoff of this Article’s central normative claim. . . .
[I]mmunizing the government from the consequences of inaction actually discourages action. The
category of passive takings therefore creates an important counterbalance to the threat of traditional
takings liability and encourages governments to reduce the overall costs of sea-level rise.”).
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The argument for using the Takings Clause to impose an affirmative duty to
protect private property, at least in cases where the government’s past actions
create vulnerabilities to natural disaster risk, is emerging. Such cases could
promote climate change adaptation by encouraging governments to weigh the
costs and benefits of both action and inaction in the face of the increasing risk
of natural disasters.36

Meanwhile, Professor Brian Lee argues that the “emergency” exception to
takings liability should be substantially limited. 37 Expanding takings to
government inaction affecting property values and removing the emergency
exception to takings liability would, in combination, allow for more
threatened and actual takings suits against the government involving
flooding, fire, drought, and other climate-related phenomena. The question,
though, is whether that would be a good thing.
As I argue below, the inaction and end-emergency-exception
modifications of takings doctrine would either not do much for or harm lower
income households and communities. It is important to articulate why this is
so for two reasons: (1) the modifications have a superficial logic, coherence,
and appeal, and (2) the judiciary, which is increasingly conservative, actually
might embrace such modifications out of deference to “property rights” and
not concern about climate change and equality. Indeed, at least one court
opinion seems to adopt the inaction modification, although the opinion
denies that this is what the court is doing.38
36

JENNIFER KLEIN, POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS FOR FAILURE TO PREPARE FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE 32 (2015), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climatechange/klein_-_liability_of_governments_for_failure_to_prepare_for_climate_change.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/E46Q-8TUV].
37
Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 400 (2015) (discussing and
criticizing the emergency exception vis-à-vis flooding); Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful
Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 128–29 (2013) (arguing that the exception is unethical
and should be eliminated); see also Jeremy Patashnik, Note, The Trolley Problem of Climate Change:
Should Governments Face Takings Liability if Adaptive Strategies Cause Property Damage?,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2019) (analyzing the exception and arguing it should be limited in the
adaptation context, but also suggesting it will not be).
38
In the case, In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658
(2018) and 146 Fed. Cl. 219 (2019), plaintiffs were owners of properties located upstream from a
reservoir. 138 Fed. Cl. at 661. Their properties flooded when the reservoir overflowed during Hurricane
Harvey. The reservoir was built decades before Hurricane Sandy and most of the residential development
in the area and before many or perhaps all of the plaintiffs bought in the upstream area. Id. The United
States argued that the plaintiffs were seeking just compensation for the government’s inaction—
specifically its failure to buy flood easements or fee ownership in the upstream areas before they flooded
during Sandy. Id. at 666. The Court explained, unconvincingly in my view, that there was government
action tied to the flooding—the building of the reservoir in the first place, although that happened many
years earlier and before intensive development coupled with climate change had intensified flood risks in
the area. Id. The case is not a particularly sympathetic one for altering the law to allow inaction takings,
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By contrast, as also discussed below, another property/constitutional
law doctrine—public trust doctrine—will require some adaptation to take
account of a new reality regarding natural resources, especially seashore and
lakefront, in an era of climate change.
A. Inaction Takings
The first modification to takings doctrine that has been suggested is a
relaxation of the “action” requirement for there to be a takings violation
requiring payment of just compensation. The Takings Clause (and its state
analogues) uses the word “take”; “take” is an active verb, suggesting that
government failure to act to protect the value of private property is outside
the scope of the Takings Clause. 39 Moreover, if the government were
required to compensate for every reduction in property value it otherwise
might have prevented but did not prevent, there would be no logical limit on
the scope of government liability. Of course, the government may have a
duty to protect private property as a result of some legal duty that is outside
of the Takings Clause, such as a duty rooted in tort law. But then any
government liability would be predicated on a violation of that legal duty—
on the tort or other duty-to-act violation—and not on a violation of the
Takings Clause.
The Federal Circuit in St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States
(in my view, correctly) affirmed the action requirement in the context of
extreme weather.40 In that case, property owners in the Lower Ninth Ward of
New Orleans sued the federal government, arguing that its failure to maintain
and armor a shipping channel the government built in the 1950s caused the
flooding of their properties during Hurricane Katrina. The Federal Circuit
took issue with the causation findings by the trial court, explaining that if the
federal government’s flood-control efforts in and around New Orleans were
considered in toto, it was entirely plausible that the federal government
actually had reduced the flooding from Katrina that otherwise would have
occurred in the Lower Ninth Ward.41 But the Court also took issue with the
plaintiffs’ theory that inaction alone could constitute a taking:

because all or most of the plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were buying into an area that
regularly flooded and was susceptible to more intense flooding in the future.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. V. To be fair, however, one could argue that regulatory restrictions on
property use do not “take” property in the most straightforward understanding of “take.” But at least in
the context of regulatory takings, the government is threatening to “take” an action—that is, to enforce
the regulatory restriction with the imposition of penalties or direct action on the property to prevent the
prohibited land use.
40
See 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
41
Id. at 1364.
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On a takings theory, the government cannot be liable for failure to act, but only
for affirmative acts by the government. “The government’s liability for a taking
does not turn, as it would in tort, on its level of care.” Instead, takings liability
arises from an “authorized activity.” In both physical takings and regulatory
takings, government liability has uniformly been based on affirmative acts by
the government or its agent.42

The facts of St. Bernard Parish could make one sympathetic to the
plaintiffs’ effort to modify takings law to allow for inaction takings. For one
thing, if the shipping channel had been privately owned and operated and if
it could have been shown that the channel was a “but for” and proximate
cause of the plaintiffs’ flood damage (as opposed to climate change,
development, and Hurricane Katrina being the cause), then there might have
been tort liability under Louisiana law. But the plaintiffs’ tort claims, after
protracted litigation and several Fifth Circuit opinions, were finally
dismissed based on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)’s discretionary
function exception to the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity.43 It
is, in fact, more difficult and complicated to sue the United States in tort than
it is to sue private entities. 44 Moreover, the Lower Ninth Ward is an
overwhelmingly poor ward, 45 so it is tempting to see the litigation as
woefully ill matched.
At the same time, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
FTCA bars some tort suits that should be allowed to proceed, such a rationale
provides a basis for legislatively amending or judicially reinterpreting the
FTCA, not for expanding the scope of takings. Moreover, it appears that the

42
Id. at 1360–61 (citations omitted) (quoting Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
43
See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. v. United States, 616 F. App’x 659, 660 (5th Cir. 2015).
The history of the tort litigation is detailed in Edward P. Richards III, The Hurricane Katrina Litigation
Against the Corps of Engineers: Is Denial of Geology and Climate Change the Way to Save New
Orleans?, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 695, 707–08 (2018). The discretionary function exception
shields the government from liability for “the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
In practice, as interpreted by the courts, the exception has sometimes provided a very broad shield against
liability. See generally Daniel Cohen, Not Fully Discretionary: Incorporating a Factor-Based Standard
into the FTCA’s Discretionary Function Exception, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 881–82 (2018) (arguing for
a more coherent and consistent judicial interpretation of the exception).
44
See KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A
LEGAL OVERVIEW 2–3 (2019) (discussing the limitations on suing the United States in tort).
45
See Lower Ninth Ward Statistical Area, DATA CTR. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.
datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/neighborhood-data/district-8/lower-ninth-ward/ [https://perma.cc/
K6LM-DN4S] (comparing income and poverty rates between the Lower Ninth Ward, Orleans Parish, and
the national average).
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plaintiffs included landlords who mostly lived outside New Orleans and that
a number of them owned multiple properties.46
There is no reason to believe, moreover, that jettisoning the action
requirement for takings will incentivize governments to pay more attention
to the needs of low-income communities and neighborhoods—that it will
make Congress and agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers do more
to protect neighborhoods such as the Lower Ninth Ward. It is, of course,
debatable how much possible future takings liability affects legislative or
agency decisions at the federal or state level.47 But assuming possible future
takings liability does factor into these legislative or agency decisions,
expanding takings to include inaction will encourage governments to devote
their necessarily finite resources to the protection of high-market-value
properties in commercial areas and wealthier neighborhoods.
Consider a stylized example: An agency is deciding how to spend a tenmillion-dollar appropriation to lessen flood risk in a county. Under Plan A,
the agency would partially reinforce levees protecting both a rich area and a
poor area of the county, such that future flooding in both areas might be less
than it would have been otherwise; however, the agency believes there will
be some flooding in both areas notwithstanding the investment. Under Plan
B, the agency would devote all its resources to protecting the rich area. Under
Plan C, the agency would devote all its resources to protecting the poor area.
In a legal regime with takings liability for government inaction as well as
action, Plan B may well seem to entail less liability risk than Plans A or C
because the takings claims of owners in the rich area would be for much
more money than those of owners in the poor areas. To the extent they are
driven by a desire to minimize future takings liability, government decisionmakers will allocate their inaction toward areas with low-market-value
properties—that is, generally residential, low-income areas.
Takings liability for inaction in wealthy areas may be greater than in
poor areas not only because of the difference of the market value of the
properties at issue, but also because wealthy people and corporations are
much better equipped to successfully pursue takings claims. Wealthy people
and corporations, who tend to be the owners of higher value properties, can
46
See Court Exhibit B, St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 385 (2016) (No. 051119 L) (listing the address of the owners of each of the properties at issue in the litigation and indicating
that several plaintiffs owned multiple properties).
47
See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 375–77 (2000) (discussing why public officials may not be
motivated by costs that will be dispersed among unorganized taxpayers); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice
and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 288–90 (1992) (noting that according to the public
interest theory of government, political dynamics and costs, rather than monetary outlays, drive
government decision-making).
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pay attorneys’ fees out of pocket. They also may be better able to attract the
best contingency-fee lawyers. In the takings context, the contingency is a
percentage of the “just compensation” award; therefore, the contingency
upside will be bigger with respect to wealthy areas with high-value
properties.48 Ex ante, government decision-makers may assume this is so and
hence overweigh possible takings liability with respect to wealthy areas.
Once inaction takings were recognized, moreover, wealthy people and
corporations could and presumably would use their resources to threaten
governments with future suits in an effort to pressure governments to take
action on their behalf, even when, as a matter of sound climate-adaptation
policy, inaction might be exactly the best policy choice. It is the wealthiest
property owners who could best afford to hire lawyers, lobbyists, and experts
to make the case that the government had led owners to believe that they
would be protected by the government,49 that protective investments by the
government are sound policy and indeed necessary, and that the claims that
owners would make against the government if it failed to act would be for
large sums and would be successful. The threat of inaction takings claims
thus would be added to the arsenal the wealthy now have in pushing the
government to do what is in their best interests. Creative lobbyists would
have a field day with inaction.
Of course, even if takings liability did not incentivize investments in or
for the benefit of lower income communities, one could argue that at least
such liability would provide low-income people compensation ex post, after
the government failed to act and there was some climate-related phenomenon
such as flooding or fire. However, the Takings Clause leaves out nonproperty
owners altogether.50 Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, owners of
low-market-value properties will face substantial obstacles enlisting good
48
Professor Patricia Munch’s empirical work suggests high-value properties receive more than fair
market value compensation, which is consistent with the assumption that the best lawyers are retained on
contingency in the high-value cases. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J.
POL. ECON. 473, 495 (1976). Professor Yun-chien Chang’s study focuses on appraisal errors, but his data
is not inconsistent with Munch’s theory. Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Court-Adjudicated
Takings Compensation in New York City: 1990–2003, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 384, 385–86 (2011).
49
After all, “expectations” is a cornerstone of takings doctrine, see Serkin, supra note 35, at 350
(“The core cases and the broad outlines of regulatory takings doctrine all involve protecting property
owners’ expectations—expectations often reflected in existing uses of property.”), and hence the ability
of a property owner to marshal evidence that they had reasonably expected their property would be
protected by the government would seem to be key to a passive takings claim.
50
In theory, renters hold a compensable property interest, but such an interest has no real value in
the case of one-year or at-will tenancies, which is how most residential tenancies are structured. Longterm commercial leases do have a value and might be included in takings litigation, but such leases are
not held by low-income individuals. See Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill & Daniel Unumb,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards
Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083, 1086–92 (1987).
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lawyers and prevailing in the litigation. By contrast, wealthy owners and
corporations are much better positioned to receive large compensation
awards on top of whatever insurance payments they can receive. Plus, FEMA
reconstruction assistance, as already discussed, already favors owners of
high-market-value properties.
In sum, expanding takings liability for inaction takings would help
create—or at least reinforce—a disaster-related legal regime that in effect
redistributes wealth from the taxpaying populace as a whole to a subset of
wealthy individuals and corporations.
B. The Emergency Exception
American law has long recognized an emergency (sometimes called
public necessity) exception to takings liability. This exception relieves the
government of liability when it invades or destroys property as part of an
effort to contain a public emergency such as a fire, flood, or criminal threat
to public safety. 51 In the classic emergency exception case, firefighters
damage private property as part of an emergency effort to contain the spread
of a fire. In such a case, the government is deemed not to have taken the
damaged property.52 The Federal Circuit recently held that this emergency
exception to takings liability extended to the forest-fire context. 53 The
original justification for the emergency exception seems to have been that,
under natural law and common law, one who acts out of true necessity cannot
be held responsible for the damage, and so too the government should be
exempt from liability.54 The more plausible, contemporary justification for
the emergency exception seems to be that, in time-pressured emergency
situations, we do not want government actors such as firefighters to hesitate
in trying to protect the public from the emergency out of fear that doing so
will result in liability for damage to private property that was necessary to
invade or destroy as part of the emergency containment effort.55
Some commentators have questioned the fairness of the emergency
exception’s denial of compensation to property owners whose property was
damaged through no fault of their own. In particular, some have urged the
curtailment or elimination of the emergency exception in the kind of

51

Lee, supra note 37, at 392–93, 393 nn.6–7.
See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879).
53
TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
54
Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 19 (“In these cases the common law adopts the principle of the natural law,
and finds the right and the justification in the same imperative necessity.”).
55
See Lee, supra note 37, at 411 (noting that a common justification for the public necessity
exception is to avoid a situation in which a government official does not act in an emergency out of
concern that the government—or she personally—may be held liable for a taking).
52
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situations that arise with climate change—including, for example, where the
government directs water during a storm toward and over one area of private
property in order to protect other areas (and the people and property there)
from the flood waters, or where the government allows a forest fire to harm
a piece of private property in order to contain the fire and prevent it from
consuming other areas.56
From the perspective of promoting equality, however, eliminating the
emergency exception would be counterproductive for exactly the same
reasons that acknowledging inaction takings would be. To the extent possible
future takings liability could or would affect the decision-making of
government actors during a time-pressured emergency such as a storm or
forest fire, elimination of the emergency exception would encourage those
government actors to direct the flood or fire toward areas where properties
have a lower market value and away from areas where properties have a
higher market value. And an outsized share of compensation made available
because of the elimination of the emergency exception will go to wealthy
property owners, because (as suggested above) wealthy owners will be better
able to find good lawyers and litigate successfully. Nonproperty owners will
get nothing.
Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States highlights why eliminating the
emergency exception is problematic from an equality perspective. Big Oak
Farms involved the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision of where to direct
Mississippi River flood waters during a storm. 57 The water had to go
somewhere, and the choice for the Corps was between Cairo, Illinois, an
impoverished small town beset by a range of socioeconomic problems,58 and
farmland. From a pure loss in value perspective, the damage to Cairo
property from temporary flooding might have been less than the loss of crops
due to the flooding of farmland. The elimination of the emergency exception,
if it had any effect, could have affected the Corps’ on-the-spot judgment to
favor the farmers. As it happened, the Corps chose Cairo—and the
impoverished people living there—over the farmland.59
Other scholars suggest that eliminating the emergency exception would
enrich already-privileged owners. Professor Justin Pidot argues that
56

See Kuo, supra note 37, at 179–82 (discussing how the emergency exception could reinforce social
injustices); Robert H. Thomas, Evaluating Emergency Takings: Flattening the Economic Curve, 29 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145, 1147 (2021) (arguing that there is no justification for the emergency
exception).
57
131 Fed. Cl. 45, 46–47 (2017).
58
See Nat Williams, Struggling Cairo Epitomizes Rural Poverty in Illinois, S. ILLINOISAN (Aug. 11,
2017), https://thesouthern.com/news/local/struggling-cairo-epitomizes-rural-poverty-in-illinois/article_
f600f4c1-4cef-5a3b-8403-3dcc1ed0eea9.html [https://perma.cc/HXS6-DCVJ].
59
Big Oak Farms, 131 Fed. Cl. at 50.
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homeowners who live in the urban–forest boundary on the edge of state and
federal forests implicitly receive a huge subsidy from the government in the
form of free fire protection that is necessary for them to even consider living
there at all.60 Moreover, these (generally well-to-do) owners should know
before taking title that even with good government forest management, fires
do happen—especially, now, with climate change—and sometimes the
government may need to take measures to contain fires that will harm some
private property.61 Elimination of the emergency exception would intensify
upscale development at the edge of forests, as it would provide buyers even
more government support for settling in what is unavoidably a hazard-filled
setting.
Professor Robin Craig argues that the emergency exception could also
allow government officials to combat drought during crisis situations by
limiting water allocations currently enjoyed—but not necessarily sensibly
used—by big agriculture in favor of domestic uses and environmental uses.62
Some agricultural interests in California, for example, hold rights to massive
allocations of water and have greatly benefitted from the subsidization of
government infrastructure that delivers the water to them.63 The emergency
exception could be an important tool for regulators during extreme droughts
in an era of climate change, especially if other avenues (such as greater
development and reliance on water markets) are insufficient to meet
compelling public objectives.
Like the extension of takings to inaction, the elimination of the
emergency exception sounds like a very reasonable idea. But in reality,
neither proposed modification of takings doctrine would further justice as
we combat and adapt to climate change.
C. Public Trust Doctrine
While I disagree with suggested modifications to takings doctrine, I
believe that another property doctrine—public trust doctrine—may need to

60
See Justin Pidot, Natural Baselines for Wildfire Takings Claims, 75 MD. L. REV. 698, 699–700
(2016).
61
Id. at 701.
62
See Robin Kundis Craig, Drought and Public Necessity: Can a Common-Law “Stick” Increase
Flexibility in Western Water Law?, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 77, 83 (2018).
63
See, e.g., John Lippert, A Few California Farmers Have Lots of Water. Can They Keep It?,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-imperial-valley-water-barons/
[https://perma.cc/2HPV-ED69] (explaining that the farmers of Imperial Valley, California, own a third
of the water used by California cities); Kirk Siegler, California Farmers Gulp Most of State’s Water, but
Say They’ve Cut Back, NPR (Apr. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/04/07/
398106067/calif-s-farmers-gulp-most-of-states-water-but-say-theyve-cut-back [https://perma.cc/8GQ8ZXFN] (describing how farmers benefit from subsidized water).
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be modified to address inequalities generated by climate change and
adaptation. Climate change may result in fewer usable waterfront areas,
including fewer beaches and usable coastal green spaces.64 It may also mean
that any structures near the shore will need to be highly adapted to flooding
risks and will be owned by and primarily for the use of the relatively
wealthy.65
One response to this situation would be coastal restoration and the
creation of more sustainable “floating” public parks near or at the edge of
the shoreline.66 But another response would be to increase public access over
private land, so that more people could at least enjoy the shore to some
extent. Exactly what modifications in public trust law will be needed will
depend on actual climate change and how various parts of the country adapt
to it. One model for judicial updating of the public trust doctrine is the New
Jersey supreme court’s famous decision in Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Association, in which the court understands the public trust
doctrine as an evolutionary one that needs to take account of public needs
that fit contemporary physical and social circumstances. 67 Just as the
Supreme Court of New Jersey updated state public trust doctrine to account
for the rise in population, urbanization, and popular demand for beach
recreation, courts elsewhere could update the doctrine to take account of the
physical and socioeconomic transformations resulting from climate
change.68

64
Denise Chow, Disappearing Beaches: Climate Change Could Wipe Out Half of the World’s Sandy
Shorelines, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/
disappearing-beaches-climate-change-could-wipe-out-half-world-s-n1150841 [https://perma.cc/T8HQ6HNM].
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See Rachel Layne, In the U.S., Only the Wealthy Can Afford to Live near Rising Seas, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2021, 7:46 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/climate-change-sea-level-homeowners/
[https://perma.cc/4UR5-JSLC].
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Michael Kimmelman, The Dutch Have Solutions to Rising Seas. The World Is Watching, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/15/world/europe/climate-changerotterdam.html [https://perma.cc/DH64-LHZQ] (explaining how the Dutch plan to build parks,
neighborhoods and other facilities that accommodate rather than contain rising waters); Koty Neelis, One
European City Made a Floating Park Entirely from Recycled Plastic Waste, GREEN MATTERS (May 31,
2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.greenmatters.com/news/2018/07/25/1CcQTN/rotterdam-floating-parkrecycled-plastic-waste [https://perma.cc/PT5M-NRW2] (describing Rotterdam’s new floating park).
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IV. REGULATORY REFORMS
As currently structured, the regulations and rules governing federal
agencies already advise them to consider climate change effects and
implications of their actions as part of impact statements.69 At the federal
level, agencies must consider the “environmental justice” implications of
proposed actions on minority and low-income communities.70 It would seem
to follow that, in considering resource-management strategies and adaptation
planning, agencies should consider how their proposed actions will affect not
just net social welfare with regard to climate adaptation but also the
implications for inequality and the costs of inequality. Even now, under
recent federal guidance for cost–benefit analysis (CBA), an agency could in
theory justify the regulation or project at issue not just in terms of net
monetary benefits and costs but also in terms of the costs of increasing
inequality.71
In practice, however, current agency regulations and rules are
insufficient to assess the adequacy of adaptation efforts generally and in
particular how they interface with questions of inequality. Some reforms are
obviously needed: FEMA’s version of cost–benefit analysis simply leaves
out distributive concerns altogether, and it should not.72 But telling an agency
to consider distributive concerns is only part of what is necessary. An agency
should ideally both (1) assess possible distributive impacts, including the
qualitative and (to the extent possible) quantitative impacts on the welfare of
low-income residents and communities, and (2) bear some kind of
meaningful burden of explaining why it would select an alternative that may
increase overall inequality. Without such a burden and at least the vague
69

See CEQ Issues New Draft Guidance on Consideration of Climate Change in NEPA Reviews,
SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/ceq-issues-new-draftguidance-consideration-climate-change-nepa-reviews [https://perma.cc/N6J9-BE58] (noting that the
CEQ’s new draft guidance acknowledges that “agencies should account for the effects of climate
change”). Indeed, the EPA emphasizes impacts on low-income communities in its current adaptation plan.
See Press Release, EPA, EPA Publishes Its 2021 Climate Adaptation Action Plan (Oct. 7, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-publishes-its-2021-climate-adaptation-action-plan
[https://perma.cc/D5UX-QQ3V].
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See Summary of Executive Order 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, EPA (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-executive-order-12898-federal-actions-address-environmental-justice
[https://perma.cc/9AXW-XNYX].
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ENV’T ECON., U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES
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See McGee, supra note 31, at 1929; Siders, supra note 32, at 249 (explaining that an “unintended
consequence of CBA may be to create or perpetuate social inequity”).
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possibility of litigation challenging an agency for not having met that burden,
new CBA requirements might have little impact.
In addition to taking distributive issues seriously in impact assessment
and CBA, agencies also need to be required to assess holistically their role
with respect to climate and adaptation, including both what they are
considering doing and what they could potentially do. Under current law,
impact assessment and CBA requirements apply only to specific proposed
major agency actions. 73 But what agencies do not do—or even consider
doing—matters a great deal for adaptation and inequality.74 These holistic
assessments, moreover, need to be periodic to be useful and must incorporate
new data that the agency gathers over time. Ideally, the assessments would
cross agency and jurisdictional lines, just as the problem of climate change
and adaptation does.
Finally, public participation requirements aimed specifically at giving
voice to low-income communities are important. 75 This means that there
must be outreach and more outreach, as well as ready and accessible
disclosure of information to the public. And public participation needs to be
early in the agency decision-making process and iterative, with feedback
provided as projects come closer to fruition and after they are implemented.
This kind of reform agenda would improve agency decision-making not
only with respect to climate adaptation and inequality but generally with
respect to the full array of issues agencies confront. But this kind of agenda
would not be easy to realize. It would face opposition from those who would
claim that it would slow agencies and further ossify rulemaking and that it
73
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would in effect raise costs of government. Indeed, many recently proposed
NEPA reforms would minimize, expedite, or even eliminate impact
reviews—even in domains such as infrastructure, where there are large and
obvious implications for climate adaptation and inequality.76
The suggested reforms would require a transformation in our politics,
which may be plausible in some states, but seems far-fetched at the federal
level. Ultimately, both executive and legislative branches at the federal and
state levels would need to commit to reform for adaptation to meaningfully
address equality. Moreover, even with enlightened federal and state
executive leadership, there need to be accompanying legislative
appropriations so that agencies actually can meaningfully fulfill their
agendas.
CONCLUSION
Inequality deserves a central place in the discourse regarding climate
change adaptation in the United States. Inequalities surely will be intensified
with climate change and adaptation. Existing inequalities in wealth will
allow wealthy individuals and localities to adapt more readily than poor ones.
Government resource management decisions and investments, and the
current realities of our politics, could further the gap between rich and poor
in terms of adaptive capacity. But expanding property rights via the Takings
Clause is not the answer to this problem; in fact, eliminating the action
requirement and emergency exception in takings doctrine would only
enhance inequality in an era of climate change. A broadened public trust
doctrine could address some of the inequality problems associated with
climate change. Above all, however, we need an enlightened and invigorated
politics that produces the needed support for a more equality-informed
administrative process at all levels of government.
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